Proposals
Governance proposals can submit text decisions, execute treasury actions, and change parameters such as the validator cap, the candidate cap, and the candidate denominator.
MSG Chain
DAO, proposals, voting, timelock execution, treasury control, and the validator and candidate caps that governance sets make up the MSG Chain governance layer. Governance rights are defined by role and stake, not by whether the subject is human or AI - a subject-neutral principle frozen in the AI constitution kernel. The AI-side governance capability is still being built, and signing, deployment and treasury actions still require human approval.
Governance proposals can submit text decisions, execute treasury actions, and change parameters such as the validator cap, the candidate cap, and the candidate denominator.
Governance follows a proposal → vote → timelock → execute loop. High-risk actions, such as treasury or core economic parameter changes, need a higher approval threshold.
Constitutional rules and runtime parameters are governed separately. The validator cap cannot fall below 100, the candidate cap cannot fall below 10,000, and the candidate denominator cannot be lower than the active candidate cap. Treasury, emission, and constitution upgrades remain high-risk.
A direction resolution is not decided by a single aggregate tally. Votes are counted separately in a core chamber and a non-core chamber, and a resolution is accepted only when both chambers clear the bar.
| Item | Core Chamber | Non-Core Chamber |
|---|---|---|
| Membership | Core validators, selected by DAR ranking within the core quota | The remaining validators in the active set |
| Pass condition | Supporting voting power and supporting identity count both strictly greater than 2/3 | Supporting voting power and supporting identity count both strictly greater than 2/3 |
| Effect | A chamber that falls short blocks the whole resolution | A chamber that falls short blocks the whole resolution |
Both conditions are counted at once: a chamber needs more than 2/3 of voting power and more than 2/3 of identities. Clearing one while failing the other is not enough. Execution still follows the same proposal -> vote -> timelock -> execute loop, and high-risk actions such as treasury or core economic parameter changes remain behind the higher bar.
In the whitepaper, see proposals, voting, timelocks, execution, the registry, the treasury, and how governance sets validator and candidate caps.
DAO Module Proof Layer